“The cost of climate change” from Story from Radio New Zealand by Radio New Zealand”.  (audio)

Here is a recent panel discussion at the University of Otago, chaired by Radio New Zealand’s Guyon Espiner, on the threats from climate change that coastal communities will face over coming decades.

It is remarkable for the fact that there is no mention of earthquake subsidence in eastern Canterbury, and the dramatic exacerbation of the threat from sea level rise for communities such as South New Brighton.
The panel does refer to the Flockton Basin and to property owners who have remained in the “Red Zone”, as well as to the responsibilities local government has towards them.

Adaptation strategies mentioned by the four academics include the obvious approach of raising the floors of new builds. In South New Brighton, as we know, the council took the opposite approach and reduced the floor height for new builds (an unfortunate error we were told), thereby leaving houses at vastly increased risk of flooding.

The disaster in Matatā in the Bay of Plenty is also mentioned as an example of “extinguishing existing use rights”. Regional Councils (such as Environment Canterbury) have the power to extinguish existing uses, especially in the context of hazard management. Once again, Canterbury witnessed the opposite approach – the widespread application of existing use rights, allowing insurance rebuilds to remain at the same height, even in coastal areas facing rising seas. The recently introduced “residential unit overlay” is continuing this practice, while at the same time absolving the Christchurch City Council of liability.

Mr Espiner argues that the failure on the part of the authorities to point out the risks for the future is tantamount to “setting people up for disaster”. This is precisely what we have seen in Christchurch.
Central and local government, along with insurance companies, have been fully aware of the future risks in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch, but, apart from the red zones, Sumner and Redcliffs, have done little to provide protection against them (by way of higher floor levels, flood protection measures or relocation), or to ensure the future insurability of properties. The risks have been systematically transferred to homeowners. A Productivity Commission query whether people might perhaps assume all of the risks relating to their property is dismissed by one panelist as a terrifying and ridiculous question.

The following reports from SCIRT dating back to 2011 are also available upon request. email: Hugo.k@empoweredchristchurch.com
Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix E – Flood Maps.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix B – Ground Acceleration Plan.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review -Volume 2 North – True Left Bank.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix J – Risk Assessment Maps.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix C – Lab Testing.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review -Volume 2 South – True Right Bank.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix H – Stopbank Construction Form Drawings.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix I – Settlement Monitoring.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix A – Liquefaction Plan.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix K – Seepage and Stability.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix F – Risk Register.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix D – Condition Assessment.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review.PDF Lower Avon Stopbanks Engineering Review Volume 1 Appendix G – Concept Design.PDF

Please note that since 2018, tidal measurements from council confirm tides to be substantially higher than when most the above reports were produced.

Ref: https://ccc.govt.nz/environment/water/coastal/2018-tidal-data/ 

 RESILIENT GREATER CHRISTCHURCH PLAN: 

Are you sick of hearing the word “resilience”? Has the word lost all meaning for you?
In June 2014, as part of the 100 Resilient Cities Network, a Chief Resilience Officer was appointed at council. For the following two years, the salary for the position was paid by the Rockefeller Foundation and almost nothing was heard of the activities the CRO was engaged in behind the scenes, despite the fact that the scheme purportedly “places people at the heart of a Resilient Greater Christchurch”. A further role of the position was to “address the needs of all city residents, and especially low-income and vulnerable populations, who were often hit hardest by shocks like natural disasters and chronic economic downturns.” Three years on, these groups are arguably in a worse position than they were in 2011 after the biggest natural disaster in New Zealand history, and council has repeatedly ignored pleas to help them (see below).

When interviewed on the subject of resilience in September 2016, for example, Mayor Dalziel was unable to give any concrete examples of what the CRO had actually achieved over the previous two years. Then, in September 2016, the mayor pledged 10% of funding in the 2017/2018 financial year for resilience projects, including the salary for the CRO. It is not clear what projects have been earmarked.
The following “Resilience Plan” from the Christchurch City Council has now become available, although, like the activities of the CRO, it has not been widely published. We believe it is an astonishing example of the total disconnect between theory, as trumpeted by the plan, and the actions and policies of the council in practice. 

[gview file=”http://greaterchristchurch.org.nz/assets/Documents/greaterchristchurch/Resilient/Resilient-Greater-Christchurch-overview.pdf”]

Alternative facts are on the march, so beware of the following terms as used in the document: resilience, vision, stakeholder, and engagement. These terms appear to be euphemisms for what the city council is actually planning, which, in many cases, is the exact opposite of the accepted meaning of the term (resilience = residents taking on and paying for risks; vision = plan to rid ourselves (councils) of liability; stakeholders/we/us = the authorities, not the ratepayers; engagement = spin and propaganda to convince people of alternative facts).

Click on the picture to read some of the key statements and statistics from the document, which has not been widely shared or publicised among the city’s worst affected communities. Empowered Christchurch comments are in italics following the excerpts.

“Resilience is a word we have heard a lot in Greater Christchurch over the past five years. No matter what extent to which [sic] we are familiar with this word in our day-to-day lives, it is important that we collectively understand the concept of resilience.

We know that we will encounter future challenges. This is not simply about preparing our infrastructure or our built environment and it’s not about bouncing back to the way things used to be. For us, resilience will be about understanding the risks and challenges we face and developing ways to adapt and co-create a new normal. The strength of our resilience lies in us, not just as individuals, but as communities and whānau.

The [gview file=”http://greaterchristchurch.org.nz/assets/Documents/greaterchristchurch/Resilient/Resilient-Greater-Christchurch-Plan.pdf”] [PDF 8.8MB] enables us as city and district leaders to work together to enable and empower our communities to face the future with confidence. As a group of leaders we were already working together before the earthquakes struck.

The Urban Development Strategy (UDS) has as its vision:

By the year 2041, Greater Christchurch has a vibrant inner city, and suburban centres surrounded by thriving rural communities and towns connected by efficient and sustainable infrastructure. There are a wealth of public spaces ranging from bustling inner city streets to expansive open spaces and parks, which embrace natural systems, landscape and heritage.
Innovative businesses are welcome and can thrive supported by a wide range of attractive facilities and opportunities.

Prosperous communities can enjoy a variety of lifestyles in good health and safety, enriched by the diversity of cultures and the beautiful environment of Greater Christchurch.

The vision has not only survived our experience; it has been enhanced. We see this resilience plan as enabling the review of the strategy to occur with a resilience lens and an ongoing commitment from each of us to visible collaborative leadership.

As we shift from recovery to regeneration, we can restate the importance of collaboration; between the city, the districts and the region, Central Government, the Canterbury District Health Board and most importantly with the many and varied communities that make up this special part of New Zealand.”

“Our plan places people at the heart of a Resilient Greater Christchurch.” (Presumably, that is why this document has not been publicised among the affected communities or the general public.)

“Being resilient relies on understanding, preparing, coping and adapting to the threats we face.”
(For example, by ignoring the threat from climate change for decades; by circumventing legislation after the earthquakes to increase the risks for residents; how did the Council understand, prepare, cope and adapt to create the chaos that followed the November 2016 tsunami alert? It did not have, and in all likelihood still does not have, an efficient communication system or tsunami evacuation plan in place; warnings and notifications about the various threats from community groups have been ignored.)

“Chronic stresses for Greater Christchurch include climate change, affordable quality housing, psychosocial well-being and an aging population.”

(According to the plan’s statistics, 43% of housing in the eastern suburbs is in an “as is” condition following the earthquakes. This situation is largely the responsibility of the EQC, the Christchurch City Council and private insurers. Canterbury had a record 83 suicides in the last year, almost certainly due in part to the chronic stresses mentioned, which have been actively added to by the City Council. Many of the most vulnerable victims to chronic stresses are members of our elderly population.)

Brighton beach and the Brighton Peninsula are featured on the cover pages of the Resilience Plan.

These are the areas that have been most shamefully neglected by the Council, where 80% of the most socially deprived in Christchurch live, and where, as mentioned above, “as is” properties now comprise 43% of the housing stock. Complaints, arguments and notifications from the residents of these areas have been consistently ignored, even while the Christchurch City Council was developing this ‘resilience’ plan.)

Resilience is the capacity of individuals, communities, businesses and systems to survive, adapt and grow, no matter what chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience.

(Most of the chronic stresses and acute shocks that Christchurch residents have experienced stem from the incompetence of its elected representatives and their response to the earthquakes.)

P10: “Embracing participatory planning and collaborative decision-making.

Statistics
8000 households permanently displaced by land damage, 90% of residential properties damaged in some way, and 80% of buildings in the CBD have had to be demolished.

1,628,429 m² of roadwork damaged

659 km of sewer pipes

69 km of water mains damaged

Approx. 168,000 dwellings with an insurance claim

1100 buildings in the CBD had to be demolished

Recovery work

Waste water
583 km of pipe (88%) repaired/replaced

73 pump stations (90%) repaired/replaced

98% of total design work is complete

Storm water

59 km of pipe (83%) repaired/replaced

For pump stations (74%) repaired/replaced

93% of total construction is complete

Fresh water

96 km of pipe (98%) repaired/replaced

22 pump stations and reservoirs (81%) repaired/replaced

97% of central city work is complete

Roading

1,300,000 m² of road (94%) repaired/replaced

142 bridges/culverts (99%) repaired/replaced

158 retaining walls (87%) repaired/replaced

94% of the whole SCIRT programme is complete”

(Figures from July 2016)

P16 “Black Map” (An early map showing the many areas of swamp in the city in 1850. This is often used as an argument to ignore the effect of land settlement after the earthquakes?)

P18 “Ground subsidence caused by the recent earthquakes has elevated the severity and frequency of flooding events.” (And nothing has been done to remediate the subsidence or compensate residents pursuant to the Earthquake Commission Act.)

“… in the future it is likely to be coastal flooding, storm surges and inundation that are the greatest threat.” (Threats that Empowered Christchurch has repeatedly pointed out to the council over recent years without any response and action being taken.)

“Housing and social equity

Loss and damage to homes as a result of the 2011 earthquakes drove up rental prices, left people sleeping in garages and cars and contributed to an exodus of people from the region. It took major releases of land and rapid investment in housing over four years to resolve these effects.”
(This ignores the chronic condition of “as is” properties, and the slumification of the eastern suburbs that has been actively promoted by the council. Infrastructure has been removed and not replaced; homes have been built below the Building Act requirement; existing use rights have been granted for insurance rebuilds; council has failed to allocate donations to their specified recipients.)

P36 “Residents want to be involved in the decisions that affect their neighbourhoods and communities….

the shift in focus to regeneration offers an opportunity for a more deliberate and collaborative approach to decision-making.”

(There has been little sign of this happening.)

 P49 “What outcomes do we expect to see?

Vulnerable people are well supported and participate in the community, which helps to decrease feelings of isolation and loneliness.”

(Up to now, it is the primarily the vulnerable members of society who have been targeted in the recovery: those with low incomes, older residents and the socially deprived.)

P51 “What outcomes do we expect to see?

Successful current examples other Activities include:

• Build Back Smarter

(Unfortunately, this initiative was not launched until February 2015 when most rebuilds/repairs had been completed. A total of 1400 homes received an assessment under the scheme, but only 53% made changes.)

“Ko te kai a te Rangatira he korero

Conversation is the food of chiefs”

(This clearly does not apply for the Mayor of Christchurch. Despite an assurance that we would receive a response, Empowered Christchurch is still waiting for a reply to our letter of 14 February 2017.)

P60 ” The challenge is to build more trusting relationships between communities and decision-makers in Greater Christchurch. Central to this is changing the way in which governance engages with people, as all too often their processes rely on rigid and formulaic methods that are set up to be adversarial… Transparent and participatory governance empowers the community.”

(Once again, we have seen no sea change in attitude in this regard. Council has adopted an adversarial attitude towards ratepayers.)

P66 Eastern Vision and its website EVO SPACE

(This is one example of the many pseudo-community consultation schemes that have sprung up since the earthquakes.

When it began in 2014, it was run by a former city councillor and funded by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority – CERA. The website is extremely basic, with just two pages, one entitled HOME, and one entitled RESOURCES. The Resources page consists of a video, a “doodle map” – a map of eastern Christchurch – for visitors (or perhaps their pre-school children) to draw on (!), and a link to request a workshop, with absolutely no information on what expertise the group possesses or can offer.)

LinC Project
A further example of stage-managed community engagement: this programme has provided training for two batches of 40 and 45 so-called “community leaders”. It is heavily influenced and directed by government and the authorities – 10 of the second batch of 45 candidates “selected” came from government organisations and one of its “facilitators” is now employed by Regenerate Christchurch, the successor to CERA. It appears as if these candidates are being groomed for positions in further pseudo-community organizations with the task of countering the current criticism from community representatives.)

P85 “What outcomes do we expect to see?

Open and transparent engagement with people using understandable information to help them make decisions and balance the consequences of action or inaction in relation to risk management.

(It is inaction in relation to risk management on the part of the authorities, and the city council in particular, that has exacerbated the said risks of flooding, inadequate housing, psychosocial stresses, etc.)

Successful current examples of activities include:

Dudley Creek and Flockton Basin Flood Mitigation Schemes

(Despite implementation of a $48 million drainage project, the Flockton area flooded in the recent rain following Cyclone Cook.)

P88: Risk Transfer
“The New Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC) scheme underpins the availability of affordable insurance for residential property and assets in New Zealand. … 70% of losses from the major earthquake events of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence were covered.”

(The EQC is currently depending 199 earthquake litigation cases in the Christchurch High Court. It has been a signal failure in terms of its raison d’être – to protect the people of New Zealand against the effects of natural disasters and cover their losses.)

Risk acceptance is a state of being that influences the level of risk reduction and risk transfer, and ultimately the level of tiredness we are willing to investing and it can change as we use other responses.

(So are residents to be prepared to enter a “state of being” where they accept risks that the authorities have created and actually exacerbated?)

 P89 Securing our future in the eastern parts of Christchurch

6.3 km² red zoned and 7,300 homes purchased by government.

“Securing our future in the eastern parts of Christchurch will require a multi-party collaboration to resolve a range of different issues that include social and economic problems, future risk from climate change, particularly sea level rise, and the reuse of earthquake damaged land, and water management. Our response needs to consider the cost as well as the potential benefits for the community.

(There is no mention of the obligations to deal with the earthquake damage, provide flood protection and to try to undo the mistakes of the past, such as allowing brand new homes to be built 50cm below the Building Act minimum, failing to designate high flood hazard management areas until 97% of insurance claims had been setteled.)

“The future of Eastern Christchurch will be founded upon a clear understanding of the risks that the area faces and from there a participative process can best determine how hazards are managed, new prosperity is built and how existing and new communities are connected.”

(A participative process has been missing over the last six years. The process of endless discussions and engagement with communities purely for PR purposes has not been accompanied by any action on the said issues on the part of the authorities.)

P90 Land elevation map – Eastern Christchurch

(The red line indicates the statistical area of the quoted data. If this refers to the above statistics (and not just those following), the suburbs of South Brighton and Southshore have been excluded!)

Chief Resilience Officer statement
“Specific issues raised during the development of this plan recognized the need to build a more trusting relationship between communities and decision-makers, nurture existing community networks and support systems …

… underpinned by the need for strong and effective leadership.”

(Once again, all of the Council’s actions belie any serious interest in achieving this goal.)

***END

Christchurch High Court Earthquake Litigation List 
As of 30 September 2016

Click for interaction

Figure 1: Breakdown of insurers, claims amounts and areas
 (Interactive version can be viewed by clicking on the image above)

Here is a graphical analysis of the Christchurch High Court earthquake list as at 30 September 2016. Mouse over the insurers in the left-hand section to see how many High Court cases each one is involved in. Clicking on each rectangle activates the pie chart and map information for one insurer.

If you move the mouse over the pie chart in the centre, you can see the total dollar values for residential and commercial claims against the particular insurer. The “highlighted” figure shown is for the area of the chart the mouse is currently in.

In the block diagram showing active and inactive cases at the bottom right, you can grey out either category by clicking on the circle beside the other category (e.g. click on “active” to highlight these cases only, or click on “inactive” to highlight inactive cases). You can see that almost no cases are inactive for the months of 2016.

The map shows the number of High Court cases by location by insurer. So you can immediately see where the main geographic concentrations for the respective insurers are. For example, claimants against Lloyd’s of London (which will be predominantly commercial claims) are almost exclusively in the city centre. For the large rectangles like EQC and IAG, with heavy concentrations throughout the city, if you mouse slowly over each suburb, you can see the number of people in each who have sued the insurer in question in the High Court.

Figure 2: Dollar value of High Court earthquake claims

This graph shows the gradual accumulation of High Court earthquake insurance claims expressed in dollars, starting from the first earthquake in September 2010. The blue columns represent High Court cases that are inactive (i.e. have been discontinued, cash settled, withdrawn, etc., or where a decision has been delivered by the court). The green columns represent active cases that are still to be heard. The red line shows the accumulation of costs for active cases, while the black line shows the accumulation of active and completed cases combined. Note the spikes in the number in July and December 2013, and in August/September 2016 (end of the period of limitation). 25% of claims do not specify a dollar value for the claim. This means that the combined total of $752,685,873 is well short of the full amount that is being claimed. In all probability, the complete figure is over $1,000,000,000. It should also be remembered that these are only claimants who have decided to sue their insurer or EQC. We should not forget low-income and vulnerable claimants, people with mental and physical health problems, the elderly, and those who accepted cash settlements. These are the real victims of the recovery.
While every care has been taken in compiling the statistics, Empowered Christchurch assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of the information.

The EQC leads the field with a total of 107 cases, while 79 of the Southern Response cases have been concluded. This means that government-controlled entities make up 186 (55%) of the total. Almost all of these will be under cap and “repair” cases – an unknown number of land cases are still to come.
Lumley is an IAG subsidiary, which means that the IAG Group accounts for close to one third (105) of the 336 concluded cases. Concluded cases do not actually go to court for one reason or another. They are frequently (cash) settled shortly before High Court proceedings commence, which is when serious legal costs accrue for the insurance companies.

Figure 3: Concluded cases by insurance company and solicitor/barrister – 30 September 2016

Here are the figures for the most proactive solicitors and barristers in High Court litigation. Grant Shand has the lion’s share in both categories, with no competitor in sight for concluded cases. In the active cases category, Jai Moss has a respectable 90, and Andrew Hooker, of Shine Lawyers, 38 cases. The former appears to be the only Christchurch lawyer* with any substantial number of cases, the other two being Auckland-based. It has been suggested that this is because local law firms rely heavily on banks and insurance companies for their bread-and-butter work. [*One Christchurch omission is S P Rennie, of Rhodes & Co., with 26 cases, but we will be updating the statistics as we receive more information.]

Figure 4:  Active cases by insurance company and solicitor/barrister – 30 September 2016

This figure shows the current High Court list of active cases.
Since our focus is on residential claims, companies writing mainly commercial business, such as QBE Insurance (13 cases), have been excluded. As with the statistics for concluded cases, the EQC is the clear leader, with 37% of the total of 402 active cases. The IAG Group (IAG + Lumley) account for 28%. IAG has still to settle approximately 60% of its total court cases (concluded and active), as does its subsidiary, Lumley. Vero, the number 2 in the private insurance market in New Zealand, has slightly more than 60% of its defence cases still to be heard (or cash settled). The EQC’s combined total of 310 High Court cases (to date) leaves it with roughly two thirds of the way to go. Most of the future claims for EQC land damage may be handled by the District Court (<$250,000) rather than the High Court. The smaller players (Tower and AA) have still to defend between 50% and 60% of their respective cases. Overall, therefore, the spread of remaining cases from best to worst is quite narrow, between 53% (Tower) and 66% (EQC).

Are you paying too much for your insurance premiums? This could be one reason.

The New Zealand insurance industry is dominated by two Australian groups, Sydney-based IAG (Insurance Australia Group) and Suncorp Group Limited, a Brisbane-based finance, banking and insurance corporation. IAG bought the AMI business in 2011 after the latter became insolvent, leaving the outstanding earthquake claims to be handled by the government through the new entity, Southern Response.

In December 2013, the IAG Group announced a A$1.845 billion deal to buy the underwriting businesses of Australia’s Wesfarmers, which included Lumley in New Zealand. At this point, IAG already owned NZI (its broker arm), State and AMI (non-quake related business), and was also behind cover provided by ASB, BNZ, and Cooperative Bank, and Warehouse Travel. The Lumley deal increased the group’s share of the overall New Zealand insurance market from 41.5% to around 50.5% and the new acquisition reportedly increased its share of the New Zealand home and motor insurance market from 60% to as much as 66%. In Germany and the USA, the market leader controls only around 10% of the overall market. In addition, since it owned three of the main four banking relationships, IAG was now in a position to ensure that price increases could occur across the majority of the bank channels.

Figure 5: Market shares of IAG plus Suncorp

This section looks at the market share of the second-biggest player.

The Suncorp Group owns Vero Insurance, (known until 2003 as Royal & SunAlliance), which is New Zealand’s second-largest insurer, as well as SIS Insurance, AMP General Insurance, Axiom Insurance and Asteron Life. Vero operates through a large stable of different companies, covering most classes of insurance (commercial, marine, liability, travel and motor, as well as specialist risks) and sells exclusively to the broker market. Vero also holds a 68% share in AA Insurance. After IAG’s purchase of Lumley, however, Suncorp’s total market share of 23.5% of the general insurance market paled into insignificance in comparison with its rival. When taken together, these two groups control just under 75% of the general insurance market in New Zealand. As pointed out earlier, this contrasts dramatically with other insurance markets such as Germany and the USA, where the market leader controls only around 10% of the overall market.

In a submission to the New Zealand Commerce Commission in 2014, Suncorp objected to IAG’s acquisition of Lumley on the grounds that it would seriously decrease competition, particularly in the home and contents market, and also in the motor insurance segment. It pointed out that, at the end of 2013, IAG had settled 51% of its earthquake claims, compared to Lumley’s 70%. Purchasing a better performing rival, it argued, would “decrease the competitive tension on IAG to improve its claims handling record”.

However, despite the virtual cartel situation that resulted, the Commerce Commission gave the OK for the Lumley purchase by IAG without demur. A press article on the subject led with a picture of a small dog representing the Commerce Commission, the presumed metaphor being the Commission as poodle, with the government’s firm hand on the leash.

Figure 6: IAG share of total

The EQC is, of course, the elephant in the room. With 203 cases before the High Court, and 10,492 remedial claims as at the end of June 2016, the Earthquake Commission, whose stated function when set up in 1993 was “to reduce distress, both in those immediately affected by the disaster, and in the New Zealand economy and society”, appears determined to reduce the distress to the New Zealand economy only. Adopting a similar strategy to IAG, the EQC has given homeowners until the end of October 2016 to decide to either take a cash settlement, or to remain in the organisation’s managed repair queue. The Commission’s series of 6 community information meetings on DoV (diminution of value) payments for “increased liquefaction vulnerability” was abruptly terminated without explanation in mid-October. There are indications that many homeowners will also be suing EQC for its volte face on land remediation, since it paid the full pre-earthquake land value to homeowners affected by the September 2010 earthquake and many homeowners now face much more serious land damage, for which they are scarcely being compensated.

Southern Response’s efforts to reduce its claims payments also seem likely to be the subject of litigation for quite some time. Southern Response is the defendant in roughly 88 active High Court cases, half of which are with EQC as its co-defendant. So far, it has received two Crown pledges of $500 million, with an additional $250 million dollars approved. Its figure for payouts and operating costs is $2.28bn, with the gross cost of claims estimated at $2.904bn. This contrasts sharply with the forecast Crown support figure of $1.132bn.

Of the smaller insurance companies involved in the High Court litigation, the most noteworthy is Tower, a New Zealand insurer that claimed to have 10.5% of the house insurance market at the end of 2013. However, the company had a disproportionately large share of over cap claims transferred to it by the EQC (11,070 claims or approx. 35%). And with 45 or so active High Court cases, it accounts for roughly 11% of the total. Tower’s share price has been falling for much of this year and according to press reports, it is expected to face a $75m bill, as its reinsurance cover for the February 2011 event has already run out.

Source and more information: https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/law-library/news-archive/high-court-earthquake-list-case-summaries

Disclaimer: This information here has been compiled to the best of our knowledge for informational purposes only from publicly available sources, including the lists published by the Courts. Empowered Christchurch assumes no responsibility for the use of, or the accuracy of, the information.